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Classic financial theory relies on the absolute perfection of capital markets, which results in one 
of the milestones of theoretical corporate finance: the firm’s value is invariant to the choice of 
capital structure. As an extension to the aforementioned proposition by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), corporate risk management is also futile.  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that capital markets do not work with absolute perfection. There exist 
frictions which make risk management decisions essential for firm’s value. Moreover, 
derivatives’ market vast importance is a good proxy of the relevance of hedging decisions for 
corporate finance. 
 
There is a remarkable volume of literature which tests the effects of risk management and 
hedging decisions for the value of the firm, mainly for the US corporate market. However, there 
is little effort on this subject for markets which work even farther from absolute perfection. 
 
This document undertakes such task for the Colombian market. Focused on non-financial firms 
and the local’s most liquid derivatives market, we find that for a panel of eight large Colombian 
corporations the growth rate of Tobin´s Q depends significantly on firm´s size and hedging. 
After controlling for relevant financial variables such as firm´s profitability and leverage, and 
other variables such as firm´s age, results suggest that an increase in hedging leads to a higher 
growth in firm´s value.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Classic financial theory relies partly on the absolute perfection of capital markets. This 




Under such assumption, Modigliani and Miller
2 -MM- develop three propositions, of which this 
paper deals mostly with the first one:  
 
[…] the market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is given by 
capitalizing its expected return […]. 
 
The main consequence of this proposition is that no matter what financial transactions the firm 
contracts, its market value is the sum of the net present value of the cash flows produced by the 
existing assets and the net present value expected from future investments.  
 
Within the term financial transactions there are a broad number of transactions, including 
derivatives contracts. Then, according to MM, there is no reason why a non-financial firm would 
enter into a derivatives contract, either for hedging or speculative purposes.  
 
Notwithstanding this enduring theoretical proposition, firms do contract derivatives. The main 
explanations for such disagreement between theory and reality hover around the existence of 
frictions such as agency costs, bankruptcy costs, transactions costs, commissions, contracting 
and information costs, taxes, among others.
3 
 
A noteworthy volume of literature tests the effect of such frictions on risk management decisions 
and on the value of the firm, but mainly for the US corporate market. Unfortunately, little 
literature exists on this subject for emerging markets.  
 
In order to contribute to the analysis of risk management decisions for emerging markets’ firms, 
this document undertakes the task of testing if Colombian non-financial firms that decide to 
hedge via derivatives contracts exhibit a market value premium.   
 
Two issues have to be acknowledged for this task. First, Colombian derivatives market is 
relatively small, where the foreign currency derivatives account for the majority of the volume 
and number of transactions; thus, the analysis uses foreign currency derivatives as the universe 
of derivatives.  
 
Second, very few firms in Colombia are listed in the stock exchange. In this study we use a 
balanced panel of eight of the most traded non-financial corporations. This second issue has an 
important implication in terms of the estimation methodology: unlike traditional panel data 
                                                      
1 A highly competitive market implies that there is atomistic competition, where the number of consumers and firms 
is large enough so that no agent is in a position to influence or manipulate market prices; that is, all agents take 
prices as given (Danthine and Donaldson, 2002). The absence of frictions means that costs are nonexistent.  
2 Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
3 Modigliani and Miller (1958), Damodaran (2002) and Crouhy et al. (2006).   2
analysis, where the number of panels is relatively large vis-à-vis the number of time periods, in 
this case we have a large number of time periods and a short number of cross-sectional units. In 
this context, it results reasonable to specify a unique conditional mean function across units and 
to model heterogeneity across large units in the specification of the variance-covariance matrix.  
(Greene, 2003) 
 
This document is organized as follows. The next section is dedicated to a review of the literature 
on risk management and hedging rationale for corporate finance. The third section covers a brief 
survey of the Colombian derivatives market. The fourth part presents the methodology and main 
results. The last section concludes.  
 
 
2.  Risk management and hedging rationale for corporate finance 
 
Risk management, as defined by Condamin et al. (2006), is a continuous for making and 
carrying out decisions that will reduce to an acceptable level the impact or uncertainties of the 
exposures bearing on a firm.  
 
In order to reduce the impact or uncertainties of its exposure, the firm may choose to hedge using 
an on-balance-sheet strategy or an off-balance-sheet strategy. The former relates to changing the 
exposition of its balance sheet (e.g. relocating production facilities or matching the currency 
denomination of the assets and liabilities to avoid currency risk, also known as operational 
hedge), and the latter to contracting instruments such as derivatives.
4 Given the authors’ purpose, 
risk management and hedging will be treated indistinctly, meaning the acquisition of off-
balance-sheet financial assets with the purpose of reducing the variance of the firm’s payoffs.
5 
 
Whether to hedge risk or not has been an issue since the beginning of risk management. Most of 
the foundations of financial theory conclude that under some assumptions financial risk 
management is vain. Not only those theoretical assumptions are clearly unrealistic, but the 
evidence shows that firms and investors do manage financial risk, and they devote a great 
amount of resources to do so. 
 




2.1. Financial theory and the rationale against risk management 
 
Modern capital structure theory began in 1958 with Modigliani and Miller
6 –MM- paper on the 
effects of capital structure on firm’s value, which has been recognized as the most influential 
                                                      
4 Nance et al. (1993). 
5 This definition of hedging is similar to the one by Smith and Stulz (1985), but the inclusion of the off-balance-
sheet feature is our own. 
6 Modigliani and Miller (1958).   3
financial article ever written
7. Their main finding relates to the irrelevance of the capital 
structure, namely the mix of debt and equity, for the firm’s value.  
 




•  Firms can issue only two types of securities: risk-free debt and equity; 
•  Financial markets are frictionless (there are no transaction costs); 
•  There is no corporate or personal taxation; 
•  Firms cannot go bankrupt; 
•  Information symmetry (insiders and outsiders have the same information); 
•  No agency costs (management acts on behalf of shareholders); 
 
According to MM, because investors can take debt just like any firm, in a perfect market they 
have no reason to pay a premium for firms doing something they can do at no cost by 
themselves. As Ross (1977) points out, the simplest proof of MM’s argument is that if the 
leverage of a firm changes and decreases its value, then by purchasing the firm (or a proportion 
of it) and reissuing the value maximizing financial package on personal account (or as a 
reformed corporate structure), individuals could realize an arbitrage profit; since such profits are 




The main intuition behind MM’s is that the cost of capital of the debt-issuing firm is higher than 
the only-equity issuing firm because the shareholders of the former bear both operating risk and 
debt (financial) risk, whereas the shareholders of the latter incur operational risk only. This 
intuition is then formalized in MM’s Proposition-II, which recognizes that by increasing the 
leverage, the shareholder is charged with an increasing financial risk for which he will demand a 
premium; thus, under the perfect market assumptions, the raise in expected returns related to 
leverage is cancelled out by the rise in risk, so shareholders’ wealth is unaffected.
10  
 
As MM concludes, their findings also lay out the foundations for a theory of the valuation of 
firms and shares in a world of uncertainty. As a natural inference from MM’s first proposition, 
the firm’s market value results solely from the sum of the net present value of the cash flows 
produced by the existing assets and the net present value expected from future investments; 
therefore, the value of a firm cannot be changed merely by means of financial transactions
11.   
 
According to MM and given that the definition of financial transactions
12  contains the 
derivatives concept, it can be inferred that the value of a firm cannot be changed by means of 
contracting such instruments.  
                                                      
7 Brigham and Houston (1998). 
8 Quiry et al. (2005). 
9 Nevertheless, due to i) higher interest rates for individual borrowing; ii) limitations on amount on debt that 
individuals can borrow from the market iii) transaction costs and iv) special tax provisions, individual borrowing is 
no substitute for corporate borrowing. (Stiglitz, 1974)  
10 Quiry et al. (2005).  
11 Crouhy et al. (2006). The italic emphasis is our own. 
12 Financial transaction refers to the creation, liquidation, or change in ownership of financial assets. (Kaliski, 2001)   4
Another influential article by Sharpe (1964) would entail a similar conclusion. CAPM (Capital 
Asset Pricing Model) establishes that in a world of perfect capital markets, firms should not try 
to diversify their idiosyncratic risks, but worry about their systemic risks only. As discussed by 
Aretz  et al. (2007), CAPM assumes that investors can achieve risk reduction at least as 
efficiently themselves through diversification or hedging
13, thus making any risk management 
transaction by the firm redundant
14; likewise, Quiry et al. (2005) asserts that under Sharpe’s 
assumptions, investors are not interested in the firm’s underlying financial engineering, because 
they could duplicate such operations themselves.  
 
Moreover, the perfect capital market assumption also implies that the prices of all assets will 
fully reflect their risk characteristics. Hence, as derivative’s prices should fully reflect their 
characteristics, to acquire such instruments cannot increase the value of a firm in any lasting 
way. This would mean that corporate risk management is a zero-sum game, unable to increase 
earnings or cash flows.
15 Additionally, Bartram (2000) points out that those arguments 
supporting the irrelevance of corporate risk management are based on international parity 
conditions between currencies, interest rates and commodity prices.  
 
Some other non-theoretical reasons not to hedge risk can also be found. For example, Crouhy et 
al. (2006) mention some practical objections to hedge: the potential distraction from the firm’s 
core business; the skills, knowledge, infrastructure and data acquisition and processing 
requirements
16; the potential risks of a not carefully structured and monitored risk management 
strategy; the new U.S. SEC disclosure requirements and new accounting standards, which 
increase the cost of compliance and may reveal the firm’s intentions or future transactions.  
 
 
2.2. Risk management rationale and evidence 
 
MM’s and Sharpe’s findings, despite being the foundations of modern capital structure theory 
and of modern pricing theory, rely on some unrealistic and questionable assumptions. As Aretz 
et al. (2007) concludes, in the presence of capital market imperfections, which consist of agency 
costs, transaction costs -such as bankruptcy and financial distress costs, and taxes-, corporate risk 
management constitutes a means to enhance shareholder’s value.  
 
Literature exhibits a consensus around the aforementioned factual distortions that justify risk 
management. This paper will classify and present those distortions as opportunities for the firm 
to exploit by means of taking advantage of i) tax shields; ii) financial flexibility; iii) the 
                                                      
13 CAPM assumes that all idiosyncratic risks (or firm’s specific risk) are diversified by the investors when 
constructing a well diversified portfolio, where the perfect capital markets assumption of a costless diversification 
and absence of economies of scale also apply. (Allayannis et al., 2001; Crouhy et al., 2006) The remaining risks 
(systematic) which investors cannot diversify in financial markets, may also not increase shareholder value, as 
investors receive an appropriate rate of return for holding such securities. (Aretz et al., 2007) 
14 It is because of this investor’s ability to achieve his desired risk reduction that the manager should not worry about 
the different degrees of risk aversion of all the investors, but should just make sure that a good project is a good 
project […]. (Rebonato, 2007) 
15 Crouhy et al. (2006). 
16 For example, Geczy et al. (1997) finds evidence that suggest that economies of scale in costs are important 
determinants of currency derivatives use.    5
disciplinary role of debt; iv) mitigating agency problems and v) information asymmetries and 
proper signaling. The analysis of each of these opportunities will consider that firm value can 
generally be increased by reducing the discount rate (cost of capital) and/or by enlarging the free 




2.2.1.  Tax shields 
 
The evident advantage of tax shielding is commonly the most common critique to MM’s 
Propositions. This distortion and its effects were addressed by MM (1963) themselves, 
concluding that different degrees of leverage result in different distributions of returns after 
taxes, thus disabling the arbitrage process by which the values of the non-leveraged and the 
leveraged firms converge.  
 
Thus, tax shielding should be included in the valuation of a firm. As mentioned by Quiry et al. 
(2005), the value of the levered firm is equal to that of an unlevered firm plus the present value 
of the tax savings arising on the debt, where this savings result from the fact that interest 
expenses can be deducted from firm’s tax base.
18 
 
Regarding risk management, tax shielding maximization, which is equivalent to tax liability 
minimization, justifies hedging. Aretz et al. (2007) asserts that corporate risk management can 
reduce fluctuations in pre-tax income and thus lower the tax burden of firms if corporate income 
is subject to a convex tax schedule
19, where the convexity of tax schedules result from 
progressively increasing marginal tax rates or limitations of special tax preference items, such as 
the inability to carry losses forward or backward for an unlimited number of years.  
 
This argument, shared by Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot et al. (1993), Nance et al. (1993) and 
Geczy et al. (1997), is based on an application of Jensen’s inequality
20 to the corporate tax 
liability as a function of pre-tax firm value. Following Smith and Stulz (1985), if hedging 
reduces the variability of pre-tax firm values, then the expected corporate tax liability is 
reduced
21 and the expected post-tax value of the firm is increased. In that sense, as shown in 
Graph No.1, despite the expected value E(V) may be alternatively obtained by stabilizing the 
pre-tax firm value close to E(V) trough hedging or by weighting pre-tax firm values such as Vp 
and Vq, it is value maximizing for the firm to undertake such stabilizing strategy since it will 
result in a lower expected corporate tax liability (since E(T*) < E(T)) for the same pre-tax 
expected firm value:  
 
 
                                                      
17 Bartram (2000).  
18 Deducting interest expenses is a kind of subsidy the state grants to leveraged firms. Nevertheless, to benefit from 
this subsidy, the company must generate a profit. (Quiry et al., 2005) 
19 This implies that the after-tax value of the firm is a concave function of its pre-tax value. (Smith and Stulz, 1985) 
20 Jensen’s inequality implies that the expectation of a non-linear function of a random variable does not equal the 
function of expected value; mathematically, ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] x E f x f E ≠ . If the function is convex, then 
() [] () [] x E f x f E ≥ . (Danthine and Donaldson, 2001; Cuthbertson and Nitzsche, 2004) 
21 As long as the cost of the hedge is not too large.   6
Graph No.1 















Source: authors’ elaboration, based on Smith and Stulz (1985). 
 
This rationale implies that costless hedging will always increase firm value. Nevertheless, as 
Smith and Stulz (1985) states, when costs are to be considered, hedging will increase firm value 
only if costs of hedging do not exceed the potential increase in firm value. Therefore, the 
derivatives market development is a key factor for the firm’s exploiting tax shielding 
maximization by hedging.   
 
 
2.2.2.  Financial flexibility 
 
As mentioned before, MM’s Proposition-I states that market value results solely from the sum of 
the net present value of the cash flows produced by the existing assets and the net present value 
expected from future investments. Regarding the latter, the firm’s ability to undertake the 
expected future investments will depend on its capacity to fund such investments; thus, there 




One way to mitigate firm’s potential underinvestment problem is through corporate hedging. As 
stated by Aretz et al. (2007), corporate risk management can align internal corporate cash flows 
and investment expenditures by reducing the cash flows surplus when cash flows exceed 
investment expenditures and providing cash when cash flows are below investment expenditures. 
 
Geczy et al. (1997), based on a 372 non-financial firms sample from Fortune 500, found that 
firms with greater growth opportunities and tighter financial constraints are more likely to use 
currency derivatives; they use derivatives to reduce variation in cash flows or earnings that might 
otherwise preclude firms from investing in valuable growth opportunities. Consequently, Geczy 
et al. concludes that hedging mitigates the underinvestment problem by reducing not only the 
                                                      
22 The underinvestment problem may result from an agency problem between the firm’s managers or shareholders 




























Vq Vp E(V)  7
costs of obtaining external funds, but also a firm’s dependence on external financing. Such 
rationale for mitigating the underinvestment problem is shared by Froot et al. (1993), Nance et 
al. (1993), Bartram (2000), Crouhy et al. (2006), and Aretz et al. (2007). 
 
Particularly, Froot et al. (1993) emphasizes that the underinvestment problem arises not only 
from the inability to undertake investment plans, but from the inability to accomplish financing 
plans; if external finance were perfectly elastic, investment plans could remain unaltered in the 
face of internal cash flows variations. Therefore, Froot et al. concludes that variability in cash 
flows disturbs both investment and financing plans in a way that is costly to the firm, justifying 
hedging to the extent that it can reduce this variability and increase the value of the firm. 
 
Evidence also suggests that hedging levels will differ across industries. Nance et al. (1993) 
asserts that the evidence of firms with more investment options having both lower leverage and 
more hedging suggest that firms that use hedging instruments have more growth options in their 
investment opportunity set; Nance et al. mentions evidence from a R&D intensive firm such as 
Merck.  
 
Froot et al. (1993) and Aretz et al. (2007) recognize that firms will want to hedge less the more 
closely correlated are their cash flows with future investment opportunities; a good example is 
the oil industry, which will find less attractive to explore new oil reserves when market price of 
oil is low and vice versa, thus making hedging not an issue. Carter et al. (2002) finds that the 
opposite is also true: airlines with a desire for expansion may find value in hedging future 
purchases of jet fuel because hedging reduces underinvestment costs. 
 
Finally, Crouhy et al. (2006) asserts that risk-reduction activities may offer synergies with the 
operations of the firm. For example, a firm which hedges the price of a commodity that is an 
input to its production process will be able to stabilize its costs and gain a competitive advantage 
that could not be replicated by any outside investor.  
 
 
2.2.3.  The disciplinary role of debt 
 
Financial distress is a state in which a firm is in, near or emerging from bankruptcy. Bankruptcy 
consists of a court proceeding in which the assets of an insolvent firm are liquidated, where 
insolvency is a condition in which a firm is unable to pay its debts when they fall due, or when 
its liabilities exceed the value of its assets.
23  
 
MM’s irrelevance of the capital structure also implies that there is no difference between a low-
levered and a high-levered firm. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that for highly-levered firms 
expected costs of financial distress affect negatively the firm’s value. 
 
MM’s propositions ignore the expected costs of financial distress given that i) it is assumed that 
firms cannot go bankrupt
24, and ii) even if bankruptcy is considered, in a perfect capital market 
                                                      
23 With Kaliski (2001). 
24 Quiry et al. (2005).   8
world, it leads to a costless negotiation of the firm’s assets, which normally ends in a transfer of 
assets from stockholders to bondholders
25.  
 
The expected costs of financial distress (ECFD) depend on the probability of entering into 
financial distress (π) and the costs related to financial distress (CFD):  
 
CFD ECFD × =π  
 
The probability of entering bankruptcy –one of financial distress’ states- may be measured by the 
firm’s distance to default or insolvency. Based on Black and Scholes’ model premises and 
assumptions, Merton (1974) measures the probability that the firm’s assets won’t suffice to 
satisfy its liabilities (i.e., the probability of default or insolvency), where the dynamics of the 
value of the firm through time can be described by a diffusion-type stochastic process, the 
liabilities of the firm are known (book value) and, thus, the equity value is perfectly correlated to 
the firm’s value, as presented in Graph No.2. 
 
Graph No.2 















Source: authors’ elaboration, with Duffie and Singleton (2003) 
 
Merton (1974) also identified the payoff or liquidation profile of a firm’s shareholder and 
bondholder across different firm’s assets value. Shareholder’s profile is similar to a call option 
and the bondholder’s is similar to a put option, both with the firm’s assets as underlying and the 






                                                      
25 Aretz et al. (2007). 
26 Mathematically, the liquidation or payoffs for the bondholder are min[A,D] and for the shareholder are max[0, A-
D], where A is the value of the assets of the firm and D is the face value of debt, which coincide with a put and a call 






















Frequency Distribution B  9
Graph No.3 















 Source: authors’ elaboration, based on Duffie and Singleton (2003) 
 
According to the previous Graph, when the asset value is equal or greater than the debt value 
(D), the bondholder will receive the face value of his claim (D), whilst the shareholder will 
receive the residual from the firm’s total value (or asset value) and the payment made to the 
bondholder. If the asset value is below the bondholder’s claim, the value of the firm will be 
transferred from the shareholder to the bondholder and the former will receive nothing.  
 
The shareholder’s payoff corresponds to his limited liability feature, which protects equity 
owners against losing more than their stake in the firm (limited downside), but provides the 
shareholder with an unlimited upside; thus, akin to a call option on the firm’s stock. The 
bondholder has a limited upside fixed at the face value of the debt (D), but a sizeable downside 
which may result in a total capital loss; consequently, analogous to a put option on the firm’s 
stock. 
 
At first sight the shareholder will try to profit from its call option-like position, favoring 
excessive risk taking against the bondholder’s interests. As presented in Graph No.2, shareholder 
has incentives to choose Frequency Distribution A instead of B
27 because the former offers an 
increase in the upside which is not compensated by an equal increase in the downside; since the 
increase in the probability of bankruptcy comes at no apparent cost for the shareholder, he will 
try to maximize the firm’s value via risk taking.
28 
 
Nevertheless, in reality, bankruptcy –and also the probability of bankruptcy- creates substantial 
costs for the firms, with negative impact on the firm value. (Aretz et al., 2007) Financial distress 
includes direct and indirect costs. Direct costs, which are related to the costs incurred in the 
bankruptcy proceeding, may include lawyer’s and accountant’s fees, administrative costs, expert 
witnesses, and shareholder’s efforts to receive a liquidation dividend. Meanwhile, indirect costs 
                                                      
27 Frequency Distribution A and B have the same mean and shape, but different dispersion. 
28 This misalignment between shareholders and bondholders incentives constitutes a case for agency problem, which 






















are those not directly related to the bankruptcy proceeding and arise when the probability of 
bankruptcy is perceived by the market, therefore include reluctance to deal with the firm, order 
cancellations, loss of suppliers and clients, distraction of management’s core objectives, loss of 
human capital, high employee turnover, among others. Estimations on the direct and indirect 
costs of financial distress state that as a percentage of total firm value, direct costs are in the 1%-
7.5% range, whereas indirect costs are in the 8.7%-20% range.
29  
 
Because financial distress costs do exist and may represent a significant portion of the firm’s 
value, shareholders won’t be able to easily profit from its call option-like position as presented 
before. As asserted by Aretz et al. (2007), bondholders will try to anticipate shareholder’s 
opportunistic –but rational- behavior and will protect themselves against the expected losses by 
demanding higher returns or by designing covenants accordingly.  
 
Therefore, in an attempt to maximize firm’s value, shareholders will minimize expected financial 
distress costs and avoid bondholders demanding higher returns
30. Such attempt, which will 
consist of decisions that minimize the probability of entering into financial distress, may include 
hedging. In fact, as asserted by Nance et al. (1993), because the probability of the firm 
encountering financial distress is directly related to the size of the firm’s fixed claims relative to 
the value of its assets, hedging becomes more valuable as the firm’s fixed claims raise.  
 
Smith and Stulz (1985) recognize that for hedging to increase shareholder wealth as presented 
before, the firm must also convince potential bondholders that it will hedge after the bond sale. If 
the firm borrows frequently, market forces will create incentives for shareholders to pursue a 
hedging policy, so the firm’s reputation will increase the price for its new debt and permit a 
continuous financing program to take place.
31  
 
Finally, by stabilizing the value of the firm and ensuring that asset value falls below the 
liabilities in fewer states of nature, hedging increases the value of the firm. By reducing cash 
flow volatility, firms face a lower probability of default and thus have to bear lower expected 
costs of bankruptcy and financial distress; a lower probability of default enables firms at the 
same time to diminish financial distress costs, increase their leverage, and therefore to benefit 
from greater tax shields
32; thus, hedging enables the firm to exploit the disciplinary role of debt.  
  
 
2.2.4.  Mitigating agency problems 
 
Agency theory says that a firm is not a single, unified entity. It calls into question the claim that 
all of the stakeholders in the company (shareholders, bondholders and managers) have a single 
                                                      
29 With Quiry et al. (2005) and Aretz et al. (2007). 
30 Bondholders demanding higher returns results in a lower firm value due to increasing costs of capital.  
31 If information is asymmetrically distributed between the buyers and sellers of financial instruments, then certain 
financial markets may break down or be severely limited, and accordingly the free access to all forms of financing 
envisaged by MM’s propositions may not exist. In loan markets, there may be credit rationing. (Stiglitz, 1990) The 
information asymmetries and their effects are analyzed below. 
32 Aretz et al. (2007). This argument for hedging as means to increase debt capacity, increase debt related 
advantages and decrease expected financial distress costs is shared by Bartram (2000) and Froot et al. (1993).   11
goal: value creation.
33 Agency theory recognizes that within the relations between the 
stakeholders there is an “agent” that makes decisions on behalf of the other, the “principal”, even 
when their interests and incentives differ completely. 
 
As asserted by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990), if information is asymmetrically distributed 
between those who make decisions (agents) and the theoretical beneficiaries of those decisions 
(principals), then the reward functions that govern firm decision making may not have the form 
of simple value maximization assumed in neoclassical theory.
34 
 
As recognized by Smith and Stulz (1985) Nance et al. (1993), Froot et al. (1993), Geczy et al. 
(1997), Crouhy et al. (2006) and Aretz et al. (2007), there is a case for hedging when facing 
agency problems. Agency problems result in the following issues: 
 
 
2.2.4.1.  Underinvestment problem 
 
As mentioned before, exploiting the advantage of financial flexibility (section 2.2.2 of this 
document) depends on the firm’s ability to undertake the expected future investments that will 
increase the present value of the firm, where hedging may guarantee a future cash flow which 
allows mitigating a potential underinvestment problem.  
 
Nevertheless, even if the firm is able to undertake any future investment project, there may be 
incentives for the managers and the shareholders to forego positive net present value projects, 
hence resulting in an underinvestment problem. Bartram (2000) states that this arises from the 
fact that increases in firm value generally have to be used to satisfy bondholders first. As also 
recognized by Aretz et al. (2007), in the presence of agency costs, managers acting in the best 
interest of shareholders invest only when gains from the project exceed the initial outlay plus 
fixed payment obligations.  
 
Risk management may mitigate this agency problem. Because any promised payment will lead 
the firm to abandon a project with positive net present value in some future states (Myers, 1977), 
hedging allows the firm to reduce the states of the nature in which the bondholder is the sole or 
main recipient of the project’s gains, therefore mitigating the underinvestment problem and 
maximizing the value of the firm via taking any positive net present value project.  
 
Nance et al. (1993) recognizes that the presence of this case of agency problem may induce 
bondholders to demand higher returns for their investment. Then, in order to induce bondholders 
not to demand higher returns, the firm must assure bondholders that such wealth transfers will 
not take place, either via restrictive covenants or hedging; if bondholders do not demand higher 
returns the cost of capital will decrease and the value of the firm will increase. Bartram (2000) 
and Nance et al. state that the underinvestment problem increases with leverage and low firm 
value, thus making hedging more likely for highly indebted firms.  
 
 
                                                      
33 Quiry et al. (2005). 
34 The information asymmetries and their effects are analyzed below.   12
2.2.4.2.  Asset substitution or risk shifting problem 
 
As already mentioned, due to the shareholder’s and bondholder’s option-like payoffs, 
shareholders have incentives to favor risky projects, since those provide an increase in their 
upside without an equal increase in their downside.  
 
Because shareholder’s payoff resembles a call option on the firm’s asset value with the strike 
equal to the face value of liabilities, the incentive to favor risky projects by the managers –who 
act on behalf of shareholders- increases with leverage; in options jargon, the more at-the-money 




Geczy  et al. (1997), Bartram (2000) and Aretz et al. (2007) support this view. The former 
affirms that if equityholders view their shares as options on the value of a levered firm, we would 
expect them to support any speculation that increases firm volatility when the firm is close to (or 
in) financial distress. 
 
As with the underinvestment problem, the presence of this case of agency problem may induce 
bondholders to demand higher returns for their investment. Then, in order to induce bondholders 
not to demand higher returns, the firm must assure bondholders that such wealth transfers will 
not take place, either via restrictive covenants or hedging; if bondholders do not demand higher 




2.2.4.3.  Managerial risk aversion and incentives 
 
Shareholders hire managers to create value for the firm. In exchange, managers demand 
compensation. Nevertheless, managers have some incentives of their own, which may not match 
those of the shareholders.  
 
First, it should be acknowledged that shareholders have the opportunity to easily mitigate their 
idiosyncratic risk via portfolio diversification, whilst managers, due to their extensive exposure 
to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk
37 and their competitive disadvantage to diversify
38, will prefer to 
reduce their risk exposure at the firm level; thus, some managerial decisions within the firm may 
be of the interest of the manager, but not of the shareholder. 
                                                      
35 When the option is at-the-money (assets value equal debt face value) the shareholder has already reached a zero 
payoff level. Then, he will be tempted to scale assets’ volatility because he has already reached the worst possible 
outcome, but he may profit from a good outcome. This price sensitivity of an option with respect to volatility 
movements (also known as vega) reaches its maximum when the strike price equals the underlying price (At-the-
money). 
36 Nance et al. (1993). 
37 Managers’ idiosyncratic risk arises from through the tied relationship between them and the firm, which is 
manifested in managers’ proportion of wealth invested in the firm, years worked for the firm, specific asset 
expertise, reputation, awards, promotions, etc. (May, 1995; Bartram, 2000) 
38 Managers are in a clear competitive disadvantage when compared to the firm when trying to diversify their wealth 
portfolios. The combination of transaction costs and economies of scale are some factors which make this 
disadvantage likely. (Smith and Stulz, 1985) Bartram (2000) also mentions manager’s difficulties to sell short the 
stock of their firm to reduce their exposure as an incentive to undertake corporate hedging.     13
As a result, some managerial decisions –such as the engagement in conglomerate mergers, 
acquisitions or suboptimal debt levels
39- benefit managers, as they lower the risk exposure of 
their wealth positions, while they are not value maximizing for the firm and not beneficial for the 
shareholders. The agency costs resulting from this type of managerial behavior, which decrease 
firm value, may be reduced via hedging. As presented by Aretz et al. (2007), corporate risk 
management reduces the variability in the firm value and thus accommodates the risk aversion of 
undiversified managers who have now fewer incentives to engage in non-value maximizing 
decisions. 
 
Second, manager’s compensation schemes may create incentives for incurring in 
underinvestment problems or taking decisions which are not value maximizing for the firm and 
shareholders. As pointed out by Smith and Stulz (1985), if managers’ compensation is a concave 
(or not too convex) function of firm value, they will have incentives to reduce variance
40, thus 
creating incentives for rejecting variance-increasing positive net present value projects. As 
shown in Graph No.4, despite the firm’s expected value E(V) may be alternatively obtained by 
stabilizing the firm value close to E(V) or by weighting pre-tax firm values such as Vp and Vq, it 
is wealth maximizing for the manager to undertake such stabilizing strategy since it will result in 
a higher expected wealth (since E(W*) > E(W)) for the same expected firm value.  
 
Graph No.4 
















Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
                                                      
39 May (1995) finds the following evidence: i) conglomerate mergers are more numerous when shareholdings are 
widely dispersed, because in such cases managers are better able to pursue policies that serve their own interests; ii) 
managers pursue variance reducing acquisitions when they have higher levels of personal wealth vested in firm 
equity; iii) there is a negative relation between CEO years vested and firm debt ratios as well as equity return 
variances. 
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To avoid this behavior from managers, if hedging costs are negligible
41, shareholders may let 
managers hedge as this increases incentives to take variance-increasing positive net present value 
projects; in the other hand, if hedging is prohibited, managers will focus more on nonpriced 
risks. (Smith and Stulz, 1985)  
 
 
2.2.5.  Information asymmetries and signaling 
 
MM’s propositions assume that the market possesses full information about the activities of 
firms. (Ross, 1977) Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to assume that information is fairly distributed 
to all parties at all times; on the contrary, asymmetric information is the rule.
42 Such asymmetry 
results in firms acting in a risk-averse manner and in mean-preserving changes in distributions of 
prices and sales having real effects on firm’s value. (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990) 
 
Furthermore, implicit in MM’s propositions is the assumption that the market knows the 
(random) return stream of the firm and values this stream to set the value of the firm. What is 
valued in the marketplace, however, is not the effective but the perceived stream of returns for 
the firm. Therefore, changes in the financial structure can alter the market's perception. (Ross, 
1977)  
 
Due to the fact that hedging reduces the amount of “noise” and increases the informational 
content of the firm’s profits (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995), managers will try to take advantage of 
their informational position
43 in order to change market’s perception of the perceived stream of 
returns for the firm and to maximize their own wealth.  
 
Concerning manager’s and shareholder’s interest in changing market’s perception of the 
perceived stream of returns, Rebonato (2007) finds that the senior management of a good firm in 
general has an interest in dampening the wildest earnings fluctuations, so that the good 
underlying trend can be more readily revealed by investors, even at the cost of giving up some 
expected return, because the ability to spot with ease the good underlying trend may more than 
compensate for some loss in expected returns.
44 Similarly, DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) expect 
that good managers (or those with good news) will prefer to hedge so as to preserve the 
likelihood of a good outcome, while incompetent managers (or those with bad news) might 
prefer to increase risk and hope for a lucky draw. 
                                                      
41 If hedging is costly, shareholders may also design compensations schemes that reduce the concavity of manager’s 
wealth as a function of firm value. This can be accomplished by including firm’s stock options to the remuneration; 
the more option-like features in a firm’s compensation plan, the less the firm is expected to hedge. (Smith and Stulz, 
1985) Contrarily, including stock-price related compensation schemers intensify the risk aversion of undiversified 
managers. (Graham and Rogers, 1999; Aretz et al., 2007) 
42 Quiry et al. (2005). 
43 Managers informational advantageous position arises from them being better informed about the sources and 
magnitude of the risks the firm faces. They have better and more current information regarding firm-specific events 
and  foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity exposure of the firm. (With Dierkens, 1991; DeMarzo and Duffie, 
1995) 
44 According to Rebonato (2007), investors like low volatility because they like to be able to estimate the true trend 
of a firm’s profits as accurately as possible, and fear that earnings noise will prevent them from doing so; reducing 
the volatility of a firm’s returns by hedging can make investing in the firm much more easy to understand, and 
therefore more appealing to investors.   15
In this sense, Affleck-Graves et al. (2002) find that firms with relatively less predictable earnings 
have a higher cost of equity capital than comparable firms with more predictable earning 
streams, ceteris paribus.  
 
Regarding manager’s interests, the information revealed by the firm’s financial results affects 
their reputation and wealth. As DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) assert, in absence of disclosure 
requisites
45, because hedging reduces the risk of the firm’s profits and the variance of their wage, 
risk-averse managers will try to attain full hedging.
46 Likewise, Bartram (2000) finds that good 
managers –interested in protecting their reputation- have a strong incentive to communicate their 
skills by hedging effectively; on the contrary, less qualified managers will be tempted to make a 
correct assessment of their performance difficult. 
 
As to shareholder’s interests, hedging may reduce the impact of unrelated financial risks (e.g. 
exchange rate risk, interest rate risk) on firm value and thus strengthen the relationship between 
stock price and management performance, making it easier to distinguish between efficient and 
inefficient managers. (Aretz et al., 2007)  
 
 
2.3. Evidence of hedging on firm value 
 
Literature provides some support for an increase in shareholders’ wealth via corporate risk 
management; nevertheless, the evidence is still fairly mixed and inconclusive (Aretz et al., 
2007), where technical issues represent a challenge still to be properly addressed. (Aretz and 
Bartram, 2009; Bartram et al., 2006) A comprehensive survey of the main findings of the 
literature on this subject is now presented:  
 
∗  Graham and Rogers (1999), based on a March-December 1995 3,232 firms sample, finds 
that hedging conveys a greater debt capacity, which results in higher firm value via a 
higher tax shield. For the average firm, interest rate hedging results in an increased debt 
ratio by 2.85%, which increases firm value by 1.4%; currency hedging results in an 
increased debt ratio by 6.87% and firm value by 2.1%. 
 
∗  Allayannis and Weston (2001) find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that hedging 
increases firm value. Based on a 720 non-financial US firms sample for the 1990-1995 
period, they find that, on average, firms that face currency risk and use currency 
derivatives have a 4.87% hedging premium, regardless of the foreign exchange 
behavior
47. Moreover, they find that firms that begin a hedging policy experience an 
increase in value above those firms that choose to remain unhedged, and that firms that 
                                                      
45According to DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), the absence of hedging disclosure requirements makes that firm’s 
profits risk reduction results in a reduced wage variability for the managers, whose managerial ability is taken as 
given by the shareholders. If disclosure requirements do exist, hedging eliminates a source of noise form firm’s 
profits, making profits a more informative signal of managerial quality, which results in more variable wages; thus, 
a disclosure rule might prevent managers from engaging in effective hedging.    
46 Crouhy et al. (2006) coincides with this argument, stating that it is not easy for shareholders to differentiate 
between healthy volatility and volatility caused by manager’s incompetence. 
47 The hedging premium is larger during dollar’s appreciation period than during dollar’s depreciation period. 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001)   16
quit hedging experience a decrease in value relative to those firms that choose to remain 
hedged.  
 
∗  Carter et al. (2002), based on a sample of 26 US airlines during 1994-2000, find evidence 
of the existence of a 12-16% hedging premium and of a positive relation between 
changes in hedging and changes in firm value. They conclude that this premium results 
from the firm’s ability to mitigate the underinvestment problem and the expected costs of 
financial distress. Particularly, Carter et al. found that the premium is due to i) the 
opportunity to buy underpriced assets from distressed airlines during periods of high jet 
fuel prices; ii) avoiding the possibility of selling assets at below-market values during 
periods of high jet fuel prices; and iii) from the ability to meet previously contracted 
purchase commitments during periods of high jet fuel prices. 
 
∗  Callahan (2002), based on 20 North American gold mining industry firms from 1996-
2000, confirms that gold investors are interested in the volatility of gold prices –they 
view gold firms as real options-, thus volatility reduction makes firm less valuable; in 
fact, author’s findings avow that investors actually place a premium on more risk for gold 
mining firms. Moreover, an industry specific characteristic, such as the fact that the 
commodity (gold) is buried while the hedging instrument is marked-to-market on a daily 




∗  Guay and Kothari (2003), using a US sample of 234 large non-financial corporations that 
use derivatives, asserts that the magnitude of the derivatives positions and the cash flows 
generated by hedging portfolios is economically small in relation to firm’s typical risk 
exposures, thus unlikely to explain large changes in firm value. Authors find their results 
consistent with derivatives being just a tool for “fine-tuning” other types of risk 
management strategies, such as operational hedging. 
 
∗  Lookman (2004), based on a sample of 125 oil and gas exploring and producing firms 
from 1999-2000, tests whether commodity price hedging creates value or not. The 
authors differentiate between firms which bear commodity risk as their primary risk 
(undiversified firms
49) and firms that are diversified and, therefore, bear commodity risk 
as secondary. They find a 15% hedging discount for undiversified firms, and a 30% 
positive hedging premium for diversified firms. Once agency conflicts and managerial 
skills proxies are considered, hedging primary risk is a proxy for bad management and/or 
high agency conflicts, whilst hedging secondary risk is a proxy for good management 
and/or low agency conflicts. 
                                                      
48 This is the infamous case for the gold mining firm Ashanti Goldfields. During September 1999 the gold price rose 
US$86 and turned Ashanti Goldfields’ futures position against the firm. This event forced the firm to implement 
deep changes in its financial management and systems, along with an issue of equity warrants over 15% of the 
firm’s shares in order to comply with the US$ 270 million collateral required by hedging counterparties in exchange 
for three years of marging free trading.  (With information form Ashanti Goldfields’ Financial Reports, 
http://www.ashantigold.com/Reports/Financial/Archive.htm)  
49 Firms that derive at least 80% of their revenues from exploration and production. (Lookman, 2004)   17
∗  Jin and Jorion (2006), based on 119 US oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001, verify 
that hedging reduces the firm’s stock price sensitivity to oil and gas prices, but finds no 
evidence of effect on firm’s market value. The authors compare their results to those of  
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and conclude that their result may arise from the fact that 
individual investors may easily identify and hedge commodity risk exposure for this type 
of firms on their own
50, thus vanishing the hedging premium. Consequently, Jin and 
Jorion assert that the existence of a hedging premium depends on the type of risk the firm 
is exposed to. 
 
∗  Allayanis et al. (2007), using a 39 countries database between 1990 and 1999
51, find that 
the foreign exchange hedging premium is statistically significant and economically large 
for firms with strong corporate governance
52, and positive but insignificant for firms with 
weak governance. Authors find that on average there is a 14.5% hedging premium for 
firms with foreign currency exposure.  
 
∗  Nguyen and Faff (2007), based on the 428 largest non-financial Australian firms listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange over the 1999-2000 period, find that the use of derivatives 
in general, and the use of interest rate derivatives in particular, are negatively related to 
firm value, whilst currency and commodities derivatives have no discernable impact on 
firm value. They blame poor reporting Australian standards on underlying exposures and 
derivatives positions for avoiding investors to make an informed judgment of the motives 
for derivatives usage, therefore, a case for information asymmetry.  
 
∗  Aretz and Bartram (2009) assert that the literature on directly analyzing the value impact 
of corporate hedging is fairly mixed and inconclusive to date, whilst the individual 
analysis of theories of value creation via risk management has serious caveats and 
limitations. The authors warn about challenges such as endogeneity
53 and identification
54 
problems; the choice of appropriate proxy variables for corporate hedging beyond 
derivatives; modeling of structural relations; the existence of other factors that may 
motivate risk management, such as earnings smoothing, speculation, or industry 
competition; and the existence of other hedging mechanisms
55, which may have 
misguided previous results on the subject.  
 
                                                      
50 Meanwhile, foreign currency exposure is not easily identifiable by individual investors, thus making corporate 
hedging more valuable for them.  
51 The authors measure value based on exchange-traded ADRs, which provides advantages such as their local 
liquidity and homogeneous accounting and reporting standards. 
52 Bartram et al. (2006) supports this finding: in countries that afford shareholders significant rights, managers may 
wish to undertake risk management with derivatives to avoid being replaced because of poor firm performance 
attributable to financial risks.  
53 i.e. firm value determines the hedging choice, rather than hedging determining value. (Aretz and Bartram, 2009) 
54 As asserted by Aretz and Bartram (2009), it is challenging to find empirical proxies of determinants of corporate 
hedging that are not at the same time also determinants of other corporate finance dimensions such as leverage, 
compensation or payout policy, and vice versa. 
55 Such as pass-through, operational hedging and foreign debt contracting to manage financial risk, with derivatives 
possibly playing mostly a fine-tune role. (Aretz and Bartram, 2009)   18
∗  Bartram et al. (2009), based on a 6,888 non-financial firms from 47 different countries, 
find strong evidence that the use of financial derivatives reduces both total risk and 
systematic risk. Derivative use is associated with a positive value premium, although 
statistically weak and sensitive to endogeneity and omitted variable concerns. Controlling 
for firms’ likelihood to hedge, the authors find that hedging firms have 10% to 25% 
lower cashflow volatility, 3% to 10% lower standard deviation of returns, 6% to 22% 
lower sensitivity to market returns (i.e. lower market beta), and 1% to 7% value premium. 
 
 
3.  The Colombian derivatives market: a brief survey
56 
 
The Colombian derivatives market is composed, fundamentally, of exchange rate derivatives. 
Particularly, interest rate derivates are almost inexistent, except for sell-buy-backs contracted 
among banks. Therefore, in this section we will focus in describing the domestic exchange rate 




During the last few years the market for foreign exchange derivatives has developed importantly 
in Colombia, favored by the growth in financial integration with the rest of the world. December 
1998’s US$1.2 billion turnover grew steadily during the next ten years reaching a total of 
US$13.2 billion in December 2008 (Graph No. 5). Coherent with this expansion the ratio of 
volume traded in the forward market to volume traded in the spot market has increased 
substantially in the last few years, from less than 25% in 1998 to almost 100% currently. 
 
Graph No. 5 
Total turnover in forward exchange rate market in Colombia 





















































Source: Kamil et al. (2008) 
 
Most of the forward contracts are undertaken by banks and pension funds. The participation of 
the corporate sector is relatively low. Indeed, total turnover of forward transactions by the 
corporate sector account for approximately 10% of the total (Graph No. 6). 
                                                      
56 This section is based on Kamil et al. (2008). 
57 Almost all of the contracts traded in the Colombian exchange derivate market are Colombian Peso – US Dollar 
contracts. The vast majority is forwards; swaps account for less than 10% of the total.   19
Graph No. 6 
Turnover of forward transactions by sector 






















































Source: Kamil et al (2008) 
 
However, although the on-shore foreign exchange derivatives market has grown remarkably in 
Colombia, when compared to international standards this market is still underdeveloped. For 
example, according to calculations of Kamil et al. (2008), in 2003 total trading volume 
accounted for 34.5% of GDP in Colombia, while the percentage for Mexico was 53.2% and for 
Chile 225.0%. Similarly, in the same year total trading volume accounted for 101.2% of total 
foreign trade in Colombia, while the percentage for Mexico was 156.5% and for Chile 418.2%. 
 
In Colombia most foreign exchange hedging instruments are non-deliverable contracts traded 
over the counter, and most of them are short-run contracts (from one week up to one month). 
Recently the Central Bank of Colombia authorized the participation of a Central Clearing 
Counterparty (CCC). The CCC will offer a futures contract, Colombian Peso – US Dollar. 
However, up to date this contract has not been launched in the market yet. 
 
 
4.  Empirical methodology and estimation results 
 
In this section we provide a brief description of the empirical methodology followed in the paper, 
and discuss the main results and their implications. 
 
 
4.1. Empirical methodology 
 
The data used in this paper consists of a panel of eight large firms for which quarterly financial 
information was collected, for the period March 1995 – December 2008. Thus, the number of 
cross-sectional units is relatively small, while the number of time periods is relatively large. In 
this context, contrary to traditional panel data settings, it appears reasonable to specify a common 
conditional mean function across the units, with heterogeneity taking the form of different 
variances rather than shifts in the means. The asymptotic theory here is respect to time going to 
infinity, while the number of cross-sectional units is fixed.   20
Another difference with a traditional panel data set is that units in the context of this study are 
quite large. Therefore, correlations across units becomes important in the specification, while in 
a traditional panel data setting these correlations are always assumed to be zero. 
 
The framework for analysis is the generalized regression model 
 
it y =  it it x ε ′ + , 
 
where  it y  represents the logarithmic growth rate of Tobin´s Q for firm i at time t,  it x  is a vector 
of explanatory variables for firm i at time t, and  it ε  is the error term
58. 
 





































The variance-covariance matrix of the perturbation terms can be written as 
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In order to parameterize the  ij Ω  matrices in order to model the cross-sectional correlation, these 
matrices must be squared. Thus, the panels must be balanced. The variance structure of the 
disturbance terms was specified to account for heteroskedasticity across panels (the variance of 
each panel differs), and to account for correlation across panels and autocorrelation of order one 
specific to each panel. 
 
In this specification, we assume  β , the coefficients vector, is the same for all panels. The model 
was estimated by feasible GLS. 
 
 
4.2. Definition of variables 
 
Tobin´s Q, which proxies for the firm´s value
59, is defined as the ratio of the market value to the 
replacement value of assets, measured as the book value of assets, following Ji and Jorion 
                                                      
58 The subscript i indexes panels, and i=1,…,m; The subindex t indexes time, and t=1,…  1 T . 
59 The rationale for the measure is simple. Firms that earn negative excess returns and do not utilize their assets 
efficiently will have a Tobin’s Q that is less than one. Firms that utilize their assets more efficiently will trade at a 
Tobin’s Q that exceeds one. See Damodaran (2002). 
   21
(2006). Specifically, this simple Tobin’s Q measure is calculated as the sum of total liabilities 
and market value of equity divided by total book assets. In undertaking this exercise we assume 
that the market value of liabilities is equal to the book value. 
  
We chose to use a simple Tobin’s Q as opposed to a more complex Tobin’s Q
60 for two main 
reasons. First, this simple Tobin’s Q has been shown to be highly correlated with more complex 
Tobin’s Q proxies, which require an estimation of the replacement costs of assets. Allayannis 
and Weston (2001), for example, report that the correlation coefficient between simple Tobin’s 
Q and complex Tobin’s Q is 0.93, while Daines (2001) suggests that similar results are obtained 
using a simple Tobin’s Q and one constructed using the more complex Perfect and Wiles (1994) 
approach. Second, this simple Tobin’s Q does not require a large data input and has been used 
widely as an effective measure of firm value. Moreover, as is the case for the Australian market 
(Nguyen and Faff, 2007), the replacement cost data is not available for Colombian firms, making 
the calculation of a complex Tobin’s Q measure impossible. 
 
 
4.2.1.  Explanatory variables included in the regression 
 
The following set of explanatory variables was included in the specification of the Tobin´s Q 
equation: 
 
a) Hedging variable 
 
This variable, which is of central interest for the study, is defined as the value of the forward 
contracts of the firm. It is computed as the sum of the short and long forward contracts firm i 
holds at time t. In the empirical specification we included up to four lags (quarters) of this 
variable. 
 
b) Firm´s size 
 
This is a scale variable used to control for the firm´s size. It is computed as the natural logarithm 
of firm´s i total assets at time t. 
 
c) Financial constraints 
 
Following Allayannis and Weston (2001) we included a dummy variable to proxy for potential 
financial constraints faced by firm i. The idea of controlling for possible financial constraints is 
that in an imperfect financial environment financial constraints may have an impact over firm´s 
value. 
 
The financial constraints variable was constructed as a dummy that takes the value one at time t 
if the firm distributed dividends on that period and zero otherwise. A firm that does not distribute 
dividends at time t might be associated with a firm that is presenting a higher degree of financial 
constraints at time t than an otherwise similar firm that is distributing dividends during the same 
period. 
                                                      
60 For example, as measured by Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) or Perfect and Wiles (1994).   22
d) Leverage 
 
As documented in many empirical papers explaining firm´s value, leverage may have a 
significant impact. We included a proxy for the degree of leverage of firm i, calculated as the 




Profitability of firm i was calculated as the ratio of gross profits to total assets of firm i. More 
profitable firms use to have a higher value than otherwise identical less profitable firms. 
 
f) Firm´s age 
 
The time a firm has spent in the market might have a positive impact on its market value. The 
age of the firm can be a proxy for tradition, especially in a country in which only a limited 
number of firms is traded in the stock market. Thus, we included the variable AGE, calculated as 
the number of years, up to time t, after the firm was created. 
 
Variables firm´s age and firm´s size showed to be highly correlated (0.68). Therefore, in order to 




4.2.2.  Sample description 
 
For the purpose of this study the sample of firms included in the empirical analysis should meet a 
number of important requirements: our interest focuses on private, non-financial firms, which 
export part of their production, and are traded in the stock exchange. These requirements impose 
an important restriction in the number of firms included in the empirical analysis. First of all, in 
Colombia only a limited number of firms are traded in the stock market. In 2009, only 100 firms 
are listed in this market.  
 
After excluding public and financial firms, as well as firms that do not export part of their 
production, only 10 industrial firms are left. Finally, two of those firms were not listed in the 
stock market for the whole period covered by this study (March 1995 – December 2008). We 
required a balanced panel, as imposed by the econometrical methodology used here; therefore we 
excluded them from the sample. As a result the model was left with eight private, non-financial 
firms, which met all the requirements described above. 
 
The information for the empirical analysis presented here comes from three different sources: 
information on the firms´ market value was obtained from the Colombian stock exchange (Bolsa 
de Valores de Colombia); information on the firms´ balances was obtained from the Colombian 
Banking Superintendency (Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia); finally, information on 
derivatives positions and the firms ´exports was obtained from the Central Bank of Colombia 
(Banco de la República).   
   23
 
 
4.3. Empirical results 
 
Table No. 1 presents the main results obtained from the regressions ran following the 
methodology described in section 3.1. 
 
Table No. 1 
Dependent variable is growth rate of Tobin´s Q 
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error 
Constant  0.0142 0.2731 
Hedging t-1  0.0468* 0.0232 
Hedging t-2  -0.0748 0.0425 
Hedging t-3  0.0539 0.0306 
Hedging t-4  -0.0149 0.0078 
Size  0.1149* 0.0205 
Profitability  -0.0844 0.0939 
Leverage  -0.0329 0.0326 
∗  Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table No. 1 shows that hedging matters after controlling for important variables widely used in 
the literature to explain the growth rate in the value of the firm. However, only the first lag of 
this variable seems to matter. In order to test whether hedging is an important determinant of 
firms´ value in the log-run, we computed the long term coefficient of this variable as a linear 
combination of the coefficients of the first four lags, and the corresponding standard error of the 
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Table No. 2 
Empirical results. Dependent varible is growth rate of Tobin´s Q 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error 
Constant  0.0142 0.2731 
Hedging (long-run)  0.0111* 0.0048 
Size  0.1149* 0.0205 
Profitability  -0.0844 0.0939 
Leverage  -0.0329 0.0326 
∗  Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
 
As Table No. 2 shows, hedging is an important determinant of the firms´ growth rate of Tobin´s 
Q in the long run. Moreover, the impact of hedging on the firm´s value is the expected one: 
increases in hedging lead to increases in firm´s value. 
 
Size also seems to matter: larger firms tend to have a higher growth rate of Tobin´s Q than 
otherwise smaller firms. This result is consistent with similar empirical analyses conducted for 
other countries. Meanwhile, the level of leverage and profitability does not seem to matter, at 
least for the sample of firms considered in this empirical study. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
There is a remarkable volume of literature which tests the effects of risk management and 
hedging decisions for the value of the firm, mainly for the US corporate market. However, there 
is little effort on this subject for markets which work even farther from absolute perfection. 
 
This document undertakes such task for the Colombian market. Focused on non-financial firms 
and the local’s most liquid derivatives market, we find that for a panel of eight large Colombian 
corporations the growth rate of Tobin´s Q depends significantly on firm´s size and hedging. Our 
results suggests that, after controlling for relevant financial variables such as firm´s profitability 
and leverage, and other variables such as firm´s age, an increase in hedging leads to a higher 
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